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ON THE COGNITIVITY OF 
MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES 
Richard M. Gale 
I begin by summarizing my previously published objections to the argu-
ment for the cognitivity of mystical experiences based on their being analo-
gous to sense experiences. Then I respond to published objections to my 
position from Alston, Gellman, Wainwright, and Plantinga. Finally, I revise 
my original position so as to meet some new objections of my own. 
Are mystical experiences cognitive, a basis on which knowledge is 
gained of an objective reality that transcends the world accessed through 
the ordinary five senses? No doubt they have an over-powering noetic 
phenomenological quality that leaves their subjects sweating with con-
viction that they are. But appearing noetic and actually being noetic do 
not always coincide, as witnessed by the equally overwhelming noetic 
quality possessed by various noncognitive experiences, such as dreams, 
and drug-induced experiences. Plainly, arguments are needed to sup-
port the cognitivity claim. Fortunately, there has been no shortage of 
arguments in recent years to show that mystical experiences, understood 
as direct nonsensory perceptions of the presence of God, are cognitive.! 
This paper will critically evaluate them. 
1. Arguments Based on an Analogy with Sense Experience 
Most of these recent arguments are based, explicitly or implicitly, on 
an analogy with sense experience, the generic version of which goes as 
follows. 
1. Mystical experiences are analogous to sense experiences in 
cognitively relevant respects. 
2. Sense experiences are cognitive. Therefore, 
3. mystical experiences are cognitive. 
Since sense experiences are taken by all but complete skeptics to be cog-
nitive, if mystical experiences should prove to be sufficiently analogous 
to them, they should be accorded all the epistemic rights and privileges 
thereunto appertaining to sense experiences. 
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Analogical arguments vary with respect to how strong they take the 
analogy to be. The weakest is a version of language-game fideism based 
on the greatest story ever told - that the language-game is played. But 
that both types of experience are included within an ongoing normative 
rule governed linguistic practice is too thin an analogy to support the 
inference of 3 from 2. For there have been numerous language-games, 
such as witchcraft and astrology, that their participants took to be cogni-
tive of an objective reality that plainly are not, given that their belief out-
puts clash with those of more deeply entrenched and well supported 
language-games. Furthermore, there are language-games in which belief 
outputs are based on subjective experiential inputs, such as those for 
making avowals of pain on the basis of introspective experience. In these 
subjective language-games the experiential verb takes a cognate 
accusative, "I pain (or feel painfully)" being the perspicuous rendering 
of "I feel a pain." 
A language-game can count as cognitive only if it supplies checks and 
tests for distinguishing between its veridical and unveridical experien-
tial inputs. Thus, the analogy between sense and mystical experiences 
can be supportive of the inference of 3 from 2 only if there are tests for 
distinguishing between veridical and unveridical mystical experiences. 
But they cannot be just any tests, for this would allow cultist type lan-
guage-games, in which the only test is based on what the cult leader 
says, to count as cognitive. The tests must be sufficiently analogous to 
those for sense experience. 
Among the analogical arguments that require analogous tests there is 
a distinction between the retail and wholesale versions. The former, 
which was advanced initially by William James in The Varieties of 
Religious Experience and more recently by Richard Swinburne, draws the 
analogy between individual sense and mystical experiences, whereas the 
latter, which has been championed by William Alston and William 
VI/ ainwright, draws the analogy between the sense experience doxastic 
practice (SP) and the mystical experience doxastic practice (MP), in 
which a doxastic practice is a normative rule-governed social practice 
for forming existentially committed objective beliefs from a certain type 
of experiential input, subject to defeating overriders. This is the whole-
sale analogical argument. 
4. The MP doxastic practice is analogous to the SP doxastic 
practice in cognitively relevant respects. 
5. The SP doxastic practice is reliable in that most of its belief 
outputs are true. Therefore, 
6. the MP doxastic practice also is reliable. 
Both doxastic practices are based on an a priori, framework constituting 
rule that holds the occurrence of the experiential input in question to 
constitute both evidence and a prima facie warrant for the belief that 
reality is the way in which it is represented in this experience. The rule is 
a priori because any justification of it will have to assume that experi-
ences of this type usually are reliable, thereby falling prey to vicious 
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epistemic circularity. The warrant for believing is only prima facie, 
because it subject to defeat by overriders consisting in flunked tests. The 
wholesale version is superior to the retail one, since the needed tests 
must be part of a social practice, given that a rule requires the possibility 
of public enforcement, which is just what a doxastic practice supplies. 
In Richard Swinburne's argument this rule takes the form of the 
"Principle of Credulity" (PC), according to which if it epistemically 
seems to a subject that x is present, then probably x is present, unless 
there are defeaters, in which an epistemic seeming serves as a basis for a 
subject to believe that the apparent object of the seeming exists and is as 
it seems to be (254). Since Swinburne gives full generality to PC, he does 
not have to present an analogical argument to justify extending it from 
sense to mystical experiences. His argument goes as follows. 
7. It epistemically seems to the subjects of mystical experiences 
that God is present. 
S. If it epistemically seems to a subject that x is present, then 
probably x is present, unless there are defeaters. Therefore, 
9. God probably is present, unless there are defeaters. 
Swinburne thinks that the only possible defeater for 9 is a powerful 
argument for the nonexistence of God, and it is the purpose of his global 
probabilistic argument for God's existence, based on an agglomeration 
of the premises of all the empirical theistic arguments, to defeat this 
potential defeater. 
My interpretation of Swinburne's argument as an analogical one, in 
which PC is initially applied to sense experience and then extended to 
mystical experiences on the grounds of their being analogous to sense 
experience, is a well intentioned anachronistic interpretation of his text.2 
For the unrestricted version of PC is not acceptable. A person's nonper-
ceptual epistemic seemings are notoriously subject to all kinds of irra-
tionalities. The best that can be said for a nonperceptual epistemic seem-
ing that a proposition p is true is that it increases p's probability over its 
prior probability, but this watered down version of PC is too weak to 
enable Swinburne to infer 9 from S. That it is pragmatically, as contrast-
ed with epistemically, rational for subjects to trust their epistemic seem-
ings is plausible, but this version of PC will not enable 9 to be derived 
from S but only 
9'. It is pragmatically rational to believe that God probably is present, 
unless there are defeaters. 
II. Objections to the Analogical Argument 
It now will be argued that the analogy between sense and mysti-
cal experiences is far too thin to support the inference of 6 from 5 in the 
wholesale version of the analogical argument. My argument is two-
pronged: It is argued, first, that the tests for the veridicality of mystical 
experiences are not sufficiently analogous to those for sense experience 
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and, second, that mystical experiences, on purely conceptual grounds, 
fail to qualify as perceptions and thus are radically disanalogous to 
sense experiences. In addition to rehashing some of my previously pub-
lished criticisms/ I will respond to objections that have been made to 
them and also will try to correct some blunders I made. 
The major tests for the veridicality of sense experience include agree-
ment among observers, successful predictions, and being caused-in-the-
right-way by the apparent object of the experience. The agreement test 
requires the observers whose testimony counts as confirmatory or dis-
confirmatory of the veridicality of a person's sense experience to be nor-
mal and in the right sort of epistemic circumstances. With respect to the 
former, they must not be subject to any psychological disorder that 
would distort their perception and their sensory faculties must be func-
tioning in a normal, healthy manner; and, with regard to the latter, they 
must be properly positioned in space and time and the causal chain link-
ing the experience with its object be of the right sort. 
The mystical analogue to this agreement test is woefully weak. In the 
first place, whereas there are objective, agreed upon tests for determin-
ing when a person's sensory faculty is not functioning properly, there 
are no such tests for determining when a person's mystical faculty is not 
functioning properly. Furthermore, there is no mystical analogue to a 
sensory observer being properly positioned in space, since God does not 
stand in any spatial relations. That there is no mystical analogue to nor-
mality of observer and circumstances results in a pernicious evidential 
asymmetry in that the occurrence of mystical experiences are taken to be 
confirmatory but the failure to have them, even when the mystical way 
of meditating, fasting and the like is followed, is not taken as disconfir-
matory. Thus the mystical agreement test is one that can be passed but 
not flunked and thus no test at all. It is like a heads I win, tails you lose 
sort of con game. 
There is no mystical analogue to the caused-in-the-right-way test, 
because there are no supernatural causal chains or processes linking 
God with worldly events. Another disanalogy is that whereas we can 
determine on the basis of sense experience alone that a given sense expe-
rience is caused in the right way by its apparent object, we cannot deter-
mine on the basis of mystical experience alone that a given mystical 
experience is caused in the right way. Furthermore, the defenders of the 
cognitivity of mystical experiences cannot agree among themselves 
whether there are any limitations on what is the right way for God to 
cause a mystical experience. At one extreme there are those like Wayne 
Proudfoot who require that a veridical mystical experience be directly 
caused by God sans any worldly proximate cause. And, at the other 
extreme, there are those like Walter Stace and Houston Smith who allow 
for a veridical mystical experience not only to admit of a worldly cause 
but any worldly cause, even ingestion of LSD. 
It is only the prediction test that seems to have any application to 
mystical experiences. All of the great mystical traditions have taken the 
subject'S favorable spiritual and moral development and the beneficial 
consequences for her society to count as confirmatory of the veridicality 
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of her mystical experience. They reason that if one is in direct experien-
tial connection with God, no less realizing partial or complete unifica-
tion with him, it should result in these favorable consequences. Thus, 
these good consequences are confirmatory of the experience's veridicali-
ty in virtue of categoreallink between them and God's omni-perfections. 
There are two difficulties with the mystical analogue to the prediction 
test. The less serious difficulty is that the predicted good consequences 
are just as likely to occur whether the mystical experience that is being 
tested is veridical or not, that is, the probability that that there will be 
these good consequences relative to background knowledge, k, and that 
the experience is veridical is about the same as it is relative to k alone, the 
reason being that k contains facts about the naturalistic causes and conse-
quences of mystical experiences. No doubt, these good consequences are 
more likely to occur if the subject believes that her experience is veridical, 
but this gives only a pragmatic, not an epistemic, justification for her so 
believing. The more serious difficulty is posed by the existence of equally 
viable rival doxastic mystical practices within the great extant religions, 
with their different conceptions of what constitutes desirable moral and 
spiritual development, revealed truths that the experience must not con-
tradict, and ecclesiastical authorities and past holy persons. 
Another way that the prediction test is appealed to is that it is more 
probable that mystical experiences will occur if God exists than if he 
doesn't, that is, the probability that mystical experience will occur rela-
tive to the existence of God and background knowledge k is greater than 
the probability that mystical experiences will occur relative to k alone. 
But this is dubious, again, because k contains facts about the naturalistic 
causes of mystical experiences. This stands in stark contrast with sense 
experience, for which it unquestionably is the case that it is more proba-
ble that sense experiences will occur if there are physical objects than if 
there are not, assuming that k in this case contains neither that there are 
physical objects nor any evil demon type hypothesis. What this shows is 
that a prediction test is confirmatory of the veridicality of an experience 
of an a-type object only if the existence of an a-type object has both 
explanatory value and prior probability with respect to a-type experi-
ences. Mystical experiences of a God-type object have been seen to have 
neither. The theist might argue at this point that it is more probable that 
there will exist creatures of sufficient complexity to be subject to these 
causes if God exists than if he doesn't. This greatly complicates the case 
for the cognitivity of mystical experiences, but it might be, as Alston, 
Wainwright, Gellman, and Swinburne contend, that we must consider 
the global or agglomerative case for theism in determining whether 
mystical experiences are cognitive. If it could be established that God 
exists this would greatly increase the probability that mystical experi-
ences are reliable indicators of objective reality. 
III. Responses to Objections 
The defenders of the cognitivity thesis have ready responses to all of 
the preceding objections to the mystical analogues to the veridicality 
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tests for sense experience. Both Alston and Wainwright stress that dis-
analogies between how these tests apply to sense and mystical experi-
ence are not damaging to their analogical argument if these differences 
are a result of a conceptual difference between the respective apparent 
objects of these experiences - physical objects and God. Because it is a 
conceptual truth that God is a completely free supernatural being whose 
behavior and linkage with the world is not nomically-based, the analogi-
cal arguer should not be bothered by the fact that the agreement and 
caused-in-the-right-way tests work in radically different ways for the 
two types of experience. But to show the conceptual basis for a disanalo-
gy between them does not explain away the disanalogy, just as explain-
ing why one has a disease does not eliminate the disease. Furthermore, a 
conceptually-based disanalogy is the most damaging sort there can be. 
Alston contends that the disanalogy between the way in which the 
agreement test applies to sense and mystical experiences would be dam-
aging if it resulted from an ad hoc requirement that this test can serve 
only as confirmatory for mystical experiences, thus being a test that can 
only be passed, whereas it serves as both confirmatory and disconfirma-
tory for sense experience. Since the evidential asymmetry in the way in 
which the agreement test works for mystical experience results from the 
theistic creed, with its claim that God freely bestows grace on someone 
whom he permits to directly perceive him, no harm is done to the ana-
logical premise. But, again, to explain why there is a disanalogy does not 
lessen the harm it does to the analogical premise. 
I had argued that the challenge posed by religious diversity to the 
mystical prediction test is especially virulent: Because these rival mysti-
cal traditions have opposing consequentialist criteria of veridicality, they 
are more deeply divided than if they accepted the same criteria but dif-
fered with respect to how they applied to specific cases. In response, 
Alston wrote the following .. "If there is no neutral procedures for set-
tling the dispute, each party is in a better position to stick by its guns 
than they would be if there were such a procedure. This is because in the 
latter case the most reasonable course would be to suspend judgment 
until that procedure is deployed. In the other case, since there is nothing 
analogous to wait for, there isn't the same reason to deny the rationality 
of each contestant's holding firm." This shows only that when the dis-
putants do not agree upon a decision procedure for settling their dis-
agreement each is pragmatically justified in holding firm in their rival 
beliefs. But Alston is supposed to show that each is epistemically justi-
fied in doing so. And herein the fact that they cannot agree upon a 
method for settling their difference more seriously divides them than 
would a disagreement about the facts, thereby discrediting the epistemic 
credentials of each of their claims. A better way for Alston to meet the 
challenge of religious diversity is to pursue the ecumenical route by 
showing that there are important commonalities between the mystical 
traditions of the great extant religions and that their differences do not 
amount to any incompatibility between their different reality-claims. 
Another defensive strategy pursued by the analogical arguer is the 
divide-and-conquer one in which each of the preceding alleged dis-
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analogies is discussed separately and shown not to be alone decisive. 
This is clearly seen in Wainwright's criticisms of my attack on the ana-
logical premise.5 With regard to the agreement test, he contends that 
"Gale overstates his case" when he claimed that are no [mystical experi-
ence] analogues to the sense experience agreement test's requirement 
that the observer and circumstances be normal" (116; my italics). No 
doubt, I am guilty of overstating my case, both here and elsewhere, 
given that before I entered philosophy I worked as a song plugger for a 
music publishing firm and became adept at the great art of the "hype-
job." But, nevertheless Wainwright does concede some force to my 
charge of disanalogy when he writes that the connection between the 
condition of the observer and her having an M-experience "is admitted-
ly looser than it is in the case of sense perception." (116; my italics). 
Another example of his giving ground but denying that this alone is suf-
ficient to wipe out the analogical argument is: "Admittedly, failures of 
agreement like these differ from those counting against the veridicality 
of an apparent sense perception. Even so, the 'evidential asymmetry' 
Gale alludes to isn't great enough to make 'the mystical use of the agree-
ment test look like a heads I win, tails you lose sort of con game'" (120; 
my italics). 
The same is said in response to my charge that there is no mystical 
analogue to the caused-in-the-right-way test for sense experience. 
"While these points are important, they aren't sufficient to totally under-
mine the caused-in-the-right-way test. For example, diversity [among 
different religions] is, as Gale says, 'a cognitively invidious disanalogy.' 
Whether it is sufficient to I destroy' the relevant analogy is another mat-
ter" (122; my italics). The tests, in general, "aren't as dissimilar as Gale 
thinks. In response to another alleged disanalogy he counters that it "is 
[not] as devastating as [Gale] thinks" (124; my italics). And when 
Wainwright summarizes his discussion of the alleged dis analogies he 
concludes that "I don't think that the contents of the tests are totally dis-
similar although the dis analogies as well as analogies are striking" (128; 
my italics). 
The italicized parts of these quotations clearly bring out Wainwright's 
piecemeal, divide-and-conquer strategy for neutralizing the force of the 
disanalogies. Although he shows that each disanalogy is not alone suffi-
cient to destroy the analogical argument, he fails to consider whether 
they are when agglomerated. Obviously, the issue of how close the anal-
ogy must be between the tests for the veridicality of sense and mystical 
experiences for the argument to work is a vague one; for, as my laid-
back Canadian good old boy, Bob, who made a prominent appearance 
in my On the Nature and Existence of God, said, "Everything is just aboot 
like everything else." As I see the agglomerative case, Wainwright has 
unwittingly given away almost the entire family farm acre by acre, leav-
ing him, at best, with only a tiny vegetable garden, to which Bob would 
counter that a vegetable garden is just aboot the same as a farm. I guess 
we'll always have Bob with us, damn him! But one thing is for sure: The 
agglomerative case is far stronger than one based on taking each dis-
analogy in isolation. 
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The same sort of divide-and-conquer strategy runs rampant in 
Alston's great, classic book, Perceiving God. He does grant that the unre-
solved problem of religious diversity "does have significant adverse con-
sequences for the epistemic status of CMP [Christian mystical doxastic 
practice] and other forms of MP" (275; my italics). But this candid 
admission of significant epistemic discreditation is countered-balanced 
by the claim that "although this diversity reduces somewhat the maxi-
mal degree of epistemic justification derivable from CMP, it leaves the 
practitioner sufficient prima facie justified in M-beliefs [mystical beliefs] 
that it is rational for her to hold those beliefs, in the absence of specific 
overriders" (279). (Are these two claims logically compatible?!) Similar 
concessions of lessened epistemic creditability are made at many other 
places in his book in response to ways in which MP is SP's epistemic 
inferior. That MP's agreement test is a pale shadow of SP's agreement 
test "shows that [MP] is epistemically inferior to SP" but it does not go 
so far as to show "that [MP] is unreliable" (220). Other ways in which he 
concedes that MP is SP's epistemic inferior is that SP is far more well 
established than any version of MP (283), that everyone must participate 
in SP whereas only a small minority participate in MP and, moreover, 
have the option of not doing so. But, like Wainwright, he never consid-
ers whether he has given away the whole family farm acre by acre when 
all of his concessions are agglomerated. Again, we run up against Bob, 
and again it might well be that how one is impressed by the analogies 
and disanalogies depends on one's background belief concerning the 
overall case for theism.6 
Jerome Gellman's defensive strategy in his Mystical Experience of God 
also treads on this ineliminable vagueness but with a twist that brings his 
position perilously close to a language-game fideism with any old tests. 
There is no good reason to make physical-object claims our eviden-
tial standard .... Our ordinary physical-object beliefs are way overjus-
tified by confirming evidence. We have extremely luxurious constel-
lations of confirming networks there. Hence it does not follow that 
were mystical claims justified to a lesser degree than that, or not by 
similar procedures, that they would be unjustified. All that follow 
would be that they enjoyed less justification than belief in physical-
object statements, but perhaps be justified nevertheless (27) 
Herein Gellman appears to be making epistemic warrant and justifica-
tion internal to a doxastic practice, each being given carte blanche to 
determine the criteria for warranted or justified belief within its own 
practice. This relativization of warrant to a doxastic practice is language-
game fideism. 
IV. My "Killer Argument" 
The second prong of my attack on the analogical argument is to show 
that mystical experiences, on purely conceptual grounds, cannot be per-
ceptual. That they are taken to be perceptual by their subjects doesn't 
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settle the matter, since mystics can be mistaken in what they say about 
their experiences, as witnessed by their mistaken claim of ineffability. If 
they were ineffable, how come mystics keep writing about them and, 
moreover, do such a good job of describing their experiences, even for 
the straight community of nonmystics. Recall that we did not want to 
give mystics privileged authority as to whether their experience is noet-
ic. That the apparent object of their experience is given independently of 
their will is consistent with their experiences not being perceptual: an 
experience of a pain has such a givenness but its apparent object is only 
a cognate accusative. What I hope to do is to unearth a conceptual truth 
about a perceptual experience that mystical experience fails to satisfy, 
thereby showing that 
A. It is conceptually impossible to perceive God. 
This would totally devastate the analogical premise. What follows is a 
reformulation of my argument in On the Nature and Existence of God (326-
43) that I hope will escape the published objections that were made to it 
by Gellman, Plantinga, and Wainwright. Their objections are based on a 
misconstrual of the argument, but the fault is mine for not having more 
clearly formulated it, which fault I hope to rectify now. 
The first step in my argument is to point out that it is a conceptual 
truth that 
B. A type of experience can qualify as perceptual only if it is 
possible its object (i) can exist when not actually perceived, (ii) be 
the common object of different experiences, both by a single person 
at different times and by two persons at the same time, and (iii) be 
such that a distinction can be made between perceptions that are of 
numerically one and the same rather than qualitatively similar 
objects of that type. 
It must be stressed that B gives only a necessary condition for an experi-
ence being perceptual. There is no doubt that the object of a sense per-
ception satisfies requirements (i)-(iii). But it is equally clear that the 
object of a mystical experience, also satisfies (i)-(iii). Requirement (i) is 
meet with £lying colors, since God is the most objective, independent 
type of being there could be, given his absolute aseity. Not only can (ii) 
and (iii) be satisfied, we can have overwhelming empirical evidence that 
they are. Consider this possible course of experience. The heavens 
become completely dark across the world as a voice from above the 
clouds says, "I am the Lord they God, and I assure you that these per-
sons (or the same person at different times) had veridical mystical expe-
riences of me. And, in case you doubt me, I will now bring about mira-
cles M, N, and 0," all of which immediately follow. To strengthen the 
case we could imagine that the same message appears over the internet 
and that there is lightning and snow which that have the sign design of 
"I am the Lord ... ". This would make a believer out of me! 
The sought for conceptual disanalogy, therefore, is not to be found in 
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B but in the manner in which B's requirements must be satisfied. First, it 
will be shown how B is satisfied by sense perception and then it will be 
asked whether there is an analogous way in which mystical experience 
could satisfy B. With regard to sense perception, it is a necessary truth 
that the perceivers and the objects of their perceptions are housed in a 
common space-time receptacle in which these objects serve as the com-
mon cause, via the different causal chains that link them with these per-
ceivers, of the, for the most part, nomic-type coherence among the con-
tents of these perceptions. This receptacle account explains how objects 
can exist when not perceived by supplying the needed dimensions in 
which to house them, thereby satisfying (i). These objects are ultimately 
individuated by their position in this receptacle, it being a necessary 
truth that objects of the same kind cannot be spatia-temporally coinci-
dent. In order to perform this individuating function for these empirical 
objects, these dimensions of space and time must not themselves be 
empirically determined.? The receptacle account also explains how (ii)'s 
requirement that an object can be perceived by more than one person is 
met by the different causal chains connecting it with these persons with-
in the receptacle. 
The receptacle account also satisfies requirement (iii). The receptacle 
creates the possibility of there being counter-examples to the principle of 
the identity of indiscernibles when restricted to fully general properties. 
Any such property admits of the possibility of multiple instantiations at 
different regions within the receptacle. And, as a consequence, we are 
able to distinguish between perceptions that are of numerically one and 
the same object and those of objects that are only qualitatively similar. In 
the latter case there are noncoincident objects that are hooked up with 
different perceptions via different causal chains. 
Let us call the receptacle explanation of how requirements (i)-(iii) are 
satisfied a "dimensional explanation." So far it has been established that 
it is a necessary conceptual truth that 
C. For an experience to qualify as a sense perception it is 
required that a dimensional explanation can be given of how its 
object satisfies requirements (i)-(iii) of B. 
It would be an egregious piece of linguistic imperialism to require that a 
mystical experience satisfy C if it is to count as perceptual. For the 
dimensional account in terms of the receptacle's dimensions invokes 
space, and the object of a mystical experience, God, is not in space. What 
must be done is to genericize C so that it is not required that the dimen-
sions of the receptacle be those of space and time. They can be analogues 
of space and time that perform the same function that space and time do 
in explaining how (i)-(iii) are satisfied. This generized version is 
D. For an experience to qualify as a perception it is required that 
a dimensional explanation or an analogue to a dimensional expla-
nation can be given of how its object satisfies requirements (i)-(iii) 
of B. 
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I think it is pretty clear that there is no analogue to a dimensional 
explanation of how the object of a mystical experience satisfies (i)-(iii) of 
B. As a consequence, mystical experiences fail to be perceptual. And this 
is the demise of the argument from analogy. 
My argument has been subject to many objections. I will attempt to 
show that they rest on a misunderstanding of it, although the fault is 
mine for not having written more clearly. Alvin Plantinga, in his 
Warranted Christian Beliep has referred to my argument, tongue in 
cheek, as Gale's "killer argument." What Plantinga refutes is not my 
argument for 
A. It is conceptually impossible to perceive God. 
but an extended version of my argument for the stronger conclusion 
A'. It is conceptually impossible to perceive or experience God. 
He gratuitously burdens me with having the onus of proving A' when 
he writes that Gale "seems to believe or assume that any experiential 
awareness of God would have to be like perceptual awareness of 
God ... [and] he therefore concludes, I think, that it is not possible to have 
knowledge of God by way of experience" (336). It is not a great feat to 
refute an extended version of an argument, since every argument admits 
of such refutation. I make it quite explicit in both the introduction to my 
argument and the concluding summary that it is an argument only for 
A. "It now will be argued that it is conceptually impossible for there to 
be a veridical perception of God" (On the Nature and Existence of God 
(326) and "Even though it is impossible to have a veridical experience, 
that is, nonsensory perception of God, it does not follow that an of-God 
experience could not be caused in the right way and thereby qualify as 
some kind of nonperceptual apprehension of God""(343). In fairness to 
Plantinga, it must be pointed out that I do make a couple of careless 
remarks, about which more will be said, that support his strong inter-
pretation of me. 
Because he interprets me as defending A' rather than the weaker A, 
Plantinga interprets me (on p.339) as defending not 
O. For an experience to qualify as a perception it is required that a 
dimensional explanation or analogue to a dimensional explanation 
can be given of how its object satisfies requirements (i)-(iii) of B. 
but the stronger 
0'. For an experience to qualify as a perception it is required that a 
dimensional explanation or an analogue to a dimensional expla-
nation can be given of how its object satisfies requirements (i)-(iii) 
of B and no other sort of explanation can be given of how its 
object satisfies these requirements. 
The crucial difference between 0 and 0' is that 0' precludes any 
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nondimensional explanation of how requirements (i)-(iii) are satisfied 
whereas D allows for iU I did point out that a nondimensionality type 
explanation could be given of how God satisfies requirements (i)-(iii), 
and thus Plantinga and Wainwright are running through open doors in 
their refutation of me. God can be individuated by his fully general 
properties, such as being the only creator of the world and a theistic 
explanation can be given for how he causes there to be by his supernat-
ural will multiple experiences of himself. Furthermore, we could even 
find out that the latter is the case by the preceding example of hearing 
the voice from above the clouds. 
It seems to me that the most reasonable way to challenge my argu-
ment is to deny that D is a necessary conceptual truth. Although it is 
obvious that sense perceptions satisfy D, it is not clear that all perceptual 
experiences must satisfy D. I am afraid that the best that I can say in 
response to this denial of the necessity of D is, "Isn't it?" It looks like I am 
again mired in the modal intuition bowl, in which opponents with rival 
modal intuitions go back and forth endlessly saying "Tis!" and Tisn'tl". 
Even if my argument turns out not to be a "killer argument," it at 
least has the power to maim, for it significantly deepens the disanalogy 
between sense and mystical experience by showing that only the former 
has an object for which there could be a dimensional explanation or an 
analogue to a dimensional explanation of why its object satisfies require-
ments (i)-Oii) of B. It is yet another acre of the family farm that is given 
away by the analogical arguer; and, when it is added on to the other 
acres that have been given away as a result of there being only quite 
weak mystical analogues to the sensory tests for veridicality, the ana-
logical premise is acceptable only by Bob. 
V. Nonperceptual Experiences of God 
50 far I have argued only that it is impossible or, at least, very dubi-
ous that there can be veridical perceptions of God. But, what about other 
types of experience? Could one of them give us a cognitive apprehen-
sion of God and thus be a source of knowledge of God's existence? 
Before considering this, I need, for the good of my soul, to point out a 
terrible blunder that I made in some of my previous publications. On the 
one hand, I contended that "even though it is impossible to have a 
veridical. .. nonsensory perception of God, it does not follow that an of-
God type experience could not be caused by God in the right way and 
thereby qualify as some kind of nonperceptual apprehension of God" 
(343). But, on the other hand, I argued that these experiences, like pain-
ings, take only a cognate accusative, as witnessed by: "It is the aim of 
this chapter to supply just such a criterion of objectivity and thus for a 
verb taking an objective rather than a cognate accusative" (314; see also 
326 and 341).; "In order for MPs to qualify as objective, not just reliable, it 
is necessary that their [mystical experience] inputs really be perceptual 
as advertised" ("Why Alston's Mystical Doxastic Practice Is 
5ubjective"869). These two claims are incompatible, and it is the latter 
that must go. I wrongly inferred from the fact that mystical experiences 
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are not perceptual that they are subjective because I operated with a 
bogus dichotomy that holds every experience to be either perceptual or 
subjective, that is, to have a cognate accusative. Mystical experiences 
might be neither, especially since their accusative, God, is not a cognate 
accusative. Maybe they could serve as a warrant for the existential 
beliefs based on them concerning the existence and actions of God in 
accordance with Plantinga's extended Aquinas/Calvin model of basic 
warrant. This model, as Plantinga makes clear in his criticism of my 
argument (336), is not confined to perceptual experiences. 
Plantinga had argued with considerable force in Warrant: the Current 
Debate and Warrant and Proper Function that what warrants a "basic 
belief," a belief that is not based on or inferred from another belief, is 
that it results from the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in 
the right sort of epistemic environment according to a design plan suc-
cessfully aimed at truth. In these books he confined himself to beliefs 
based on the "standard package" faculties of sense, memory, introspec-
tion, sympathy, and a priori reason. In his monumental Warranted 
Christian Belief, Plantinga argues that it is possible that theistic and, in 
particular, Christian beliefs have warrant in an analogous way to that in 
which these standard package beliefs do.' If theism is true, then God 
would want to reveal himself to created persons. Toward this end he 
implanted in them as part of their original cognitive equipment, along 
with the cognitive faculties in the standard package, a sensus divinitatis 
that would enable them to form true noninferential beliefs about God's 
presence, nature, and intentions upon having certain experiences, both 
perceptual and nonperceptual. Plantinga also introduces a special super-
natural process involving the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit by 
which one is directly caused by God, without any intervening worldly 
causes, to believe the great things of the Gospel concerning the incarna-
tion, resurrection, and atonement. 
Plantinga does not argue that people are in fact warranted in their 
basic Christian or theistic beliefs by this model - to do so he would have 
to argue for the existence of God and our possession of a sensus divini-
tatis - only that it is possible that they have basic warrant for these 
beliefs. Furthermore, they can have such warrant even if the believers are 
not able to give any evidential or arugmentative backing for these beliefs. 
His argument is based on a rich analogy between the sensus divinitatis 
and the standard package faculties and goes as follows. 
10. The sensus divinitatis is analogous to the standard package fac-
ulties. 
11. Some beliefs based on the standard package faculties are basi-
cally warranted. 
12. Therefore, it is possible that theistic and, in particular, Christian 
beliefs based upon the sensus divinitatis also are basically war-
ranted. 
The astute reader, at this point, knows just what moves I am going to 
make against this argument - attack its analogical premise in just the 
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same way I did the analogical premise 4 of the doxastic practice version 
of the analogical argument. The heart of Plantinga's analogy is that we 
can say of both standard package faculties and the sensus divinitatis fac-
ulty that they are "functioning properly," as contrasted with suffering 
from a "disease," being "dysfunctional," "malfunctioning," suffering 
from a "pathology," or being in "disorder." 
Now either we predicate these terms in the same sense of both types 
of faculties or we do not. On both alternatives the argument fares badly. 
If these terms are predicated in the same sense, the analogical premise 
fares badly, suffering from all the disanalogies that were seen to under-
mine the analogy between SP and MP. There are agreed upon objective 
tests for the standard package faculties being in a state of dysfunction, 
pathology, disorder, or malfunctioning. But there are no sensus divini-
tatis analogues to these tests. In regard to basic religious beliefs that are 
internally instigated by the Holy Spirit, it is obvious that the notion of 
proper functioning could have no application to them since they are 
supernaturally caused directly by God. Such instigation, furthermore, is 
not a faculty but a process and this cannot be said to have any function 
and therefore cannot be said to malfunction or be subject to a pathology. 
Plantinga continually talks about the sensus divinitatis in natural law 
terms; but, whereas for Aristotelian natural law theorists questions con-
cerning an individual's nature and proper mode of functioning are to be 
answered, at least in part, by empirical inquiry, there is nothing analo-
gous in regard to determining the nature and proper function of the sen-
sus divinitatis or for what constitutes a proper way for the internal insti-
gation of the Holy Spirit to occur. 
There are further damaging dis analogies between Plantinga's 
Aquinas / Calvin experience and those in the standard package. Whereas 
there is universal participation in the very same doxastic practices based 
on the experiences in the standard package, this is not so for sensus 
divinitatis-based experiences. Plantinga has an explanation for this dis-
analogy based upon the serious damage that was done to the sensus 
divinitatis as a result of Original Sin, a damage that is repairable only by 
the supernatural intervention of the Holy Spirit. But to explain why 
there is this disanalogy does not explain it away. Another damning dis-
analogy is that there is no standard package analogue to religious diver-
sity, which issue has already been treated. 
The multivocalist horn of my dilemma argument fares no better than 
did the univocalist one. Plantinga now is to say that these terms 
("pathology," etc.) are predicated with a different sense of the two kinds 
of faculties. This precludes Plantinga's making use of the results estab-
lished in his two earlier Warrant books in his argument for the possibili-
ty of having a warranted basic belief that God exists. Thus, basic sensus 
divinitatis-based beliefs can be said to admit of the dysfunction-proper 
function distinction just as do standard package beliefs, only the tests for 
the former will be radically different from those for the latter. Whereas 
the latter are based on empirical tests that are grounded in what is 
vouchsafed by science, the former will be based on criteria that are inter-
nal to the different religious doxastic practices and thus will vary across 
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these practices. And this is language-game fideism, a most vile doctrine 
and one that Plantinga's ardent theological realism rightly rejectsY 
In conclusion, it must be stressed again that it is possible that there be 
veridical nonperceptual experiences of God's presence, only they could 
not give warrant to the beliefs based on them so that they would consti-
tute knowledge. There is a very powerful William James-style will-to-
believe argument for it being pragmatically rational for the subjects of 
mystical experiences to believe both that their experiences are veridical 
perceptions and that MP is a reliable objective doxastic practice, but this 
is a story for another paper.12 
University of Pittsburgh, Professor Emeritus 
NOTES 
1. See in particular: William Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology of 
Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); William 
Wainwright, Mysticism, A Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value, and Moral 
Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); Gary Guting, 
Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1982); Jerome Gellman, Experience of God and the Rationality of 
Theistic Belief (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), and Mystical 
Experience of God (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Richard Swinburne, The Existence 
of God (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1991). References to these books will be 
made within parentheses in the body of the paper. 
2. Jerome Gellman's argument in Mystical Experience of God (17) is based 
on Swinburne's Principle of Credulity, but it is unclear whether he gives it full 
generality and thus whether his argument is analogical.. 
3. The publications in question are: Chapter 8 of On the Nature and 
Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); "Why 
Alston's Mystical Doxastic Practice Is Subjective," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 4 (1994), along with Alston's response; "The Overall 
Argument of Alston's Perceiving God," Religious Studies 30 (1994), along with 
Alston's response; "Swinburne on Religious Experience," in Reason and the 
Christian Religion: Essays in Honour of Richard Swinburne, ed. A. Padgett 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); A Critical Study of Keith Yandell's The 
Epistemology of Religious Experience, Faith and Philosophy (1995); and" A 
Response to My Critics," Philo 6 (2003). 
4. "Response to Critics," Religious Studies 30 (1994), pp. 174-5. 
5. "Gale on Religious Experiencce," Philo 6 (2003). 
6. For an insightful account of this see William Alston, "The 
Distinctiveness of the Epistemology of Religious Belief," in The Rationality of 
Theism, eds. G. Bruntrup and R. Tacelli (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999). 
7. For the full details on this see my Problems of Negation and Non-Being, 
The American Philosophical Quarterly, Monograph 10 (1975), reprinted in my col-
lected paper, God and Metaphysics (Amherst: Prometheus Press, 2004). 
8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 335. 
9. Wainwright also so interprets me. Op. Cit., p. 160. Gellman, on the 
other hand, when he lists the key propositions in my argument, fails to men-
tion D. Op. Cit., p. 40. 
10. For a detailed account of exactly how his argument is analogical see my 
ON THE COGNITIVITY OF MYSTICAL EXPERIENCES 441 
"Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief" Philo 4 (2001). 
11. See Plantinga's trenchant objections to fide ism in his "Reason and 
Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Plantinga and Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame, In.: the University of Notre DamePress, 1983), pp. 87-9. 
12. For the full details I refer the reader to my The Divided Self of William 
James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), an abridged version of 
which, The Philosophy of William James: an Introduction, is appear in September 
of 2004. 
